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As national efforts to reduce CO2 emissions intensify, policy-makers need increasingly specific, subnational
information about the sources of CO2 and the potential reductions and economic implications of different possible
policies. This is particularly true in China, a large and economically diverse country that has rapidly industrialized and
urbanized and that has pledged under the Paris Agreement that its emissions will peak by 2030. We present new, city-
level estimates of CO2 emissions for 182 Chinese cities, decomposed into 17 different fossil fuels, 46 socioeconomic
sectors, and 7 industrial processes. We find that more affluent cities have systematically lower emissions per unit of
grossdomestic product (GDP), supportedby imports from less affluent, industrial cities locatednearby. In turn, clusters
of industrial cities are supported by nearby centers of coal or oil extraction. Whereas policies directly targeting
manufacturing and electric power infrastructure would drastically undermine the GDP of industrial cities, consumption-
based policies might allow emission reductions to be subsidized by those with greater ability to pay. In particular, sector-
basedanalysis of each city suggests that technological improvements couldbeapractical andeffectivemeansof reducing
emissions while maintaining growth and the current economic structure and energy system. We explore city-level emis-
sion reductions under three scenarios of technological progress to show that substantial reductions (up to 31%) are pos-
sible by updating a disproportionately small fraction of existing infrastructure. fro
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 INTRODUCTION
Under the Paris Agreement, China pledged that its emissions will peak
by 2030 and that it will decrease the carbon intensity [CO2 emissions
per unit of gross domestic product (GDP)] of its economy by 60 to 65%
relative to 2005 levels (1). To fulfill these ambitious commitments in the
most cost-effective way, policy-makers seek to characterize the sources
ofCO2 inasmuchdetail as possible and toassess thepotential for emission
reductions and economic losses related to different policy approaches.
Urbanization is a major driver of economic growth in China, and—
as elsewhere—cities produce most (85%) of China’s CO2 emissions (2).
For this reason, China’s cities play an increasingly important role in its o
n
 July 18, 2018
/efforts to reduce CO2 emissions. For example, the newly launched
Emission Trading Scheme in 2017 intends to monitor and control
national CO2 emissions and energy consumption at the city/firm level
as part of an emission peak by 2030. Currently, the Emission Trading
Scheme covers only the electricity sector owing to data accessibility. The
further success of the scheme will depend on accurate sector-level
accounts of city emissions, as well as the cooperation of city-level gov-
ernments where many officials are concerned about the economic im-
pacts of energy and emission constraints. However, in comparison to
national and provincial emissions, data to support city-level emission
inventories are generally less available and of lower quality.
Because of these data limitations, previous studies have focused on
megacities in developed countries for which energy datawere consistent
and systematic, particularly cities in the United States. For example,
Ramaswami et al. (3) developed a hybrid life cycle–based methodology
for conducting city-scale greenhouse gas inventories, and their sub-
sequent studies (4) applied themethod to eightU.S. cities. Kennedy et al.
(5, 6) also estimated the emissions of 10 megacities. Matese et al. (7)
estimated theCO2 emissions of Florence, Italy, based on carbon flux ob-
servations. Later, attempts were also made to estimate the city-level
emissions in some developing countries. D’Almeida Martins and da
Costa Ferreira (8) analyzed emissions of two Brazil megacities: São
Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Ali and Nitivattananon (9) discussed the
emissions from the city of Lahore (in Pakistan) from 1971 to 2010.
Only recently have studies begun to include large and rapidly grow-
ing Chinese cities (10, 11), usually by adopting statistical downscaling
methods. For example, Creutzig et al. (12) built an energy/emission data
set of 274 global cities, assessing their aggregate potential for urban
climate change mitigation. Of the 274 cities, 37 are from China. How-
ever, the data inCreutzig et al. (12) were collected frommultiple sources
of inconsistent statistical caliber and quality. Dhakal (13) similarly
estimated the emissions of provincial capital cities in China using pro-
vincial average energy intensity (energy per GDP energy consump-
tion) and GDP index, thus introducing large uncertainties. In contrast,
Wang et al. (14) analyzed the emissions from China’s provincial capital
cities based on the cities’ statistical yearbooks. Ramaswami et al. (15)1 of 15
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 further estimated emissions from 637 Chinese cities by downscaling
from national/provincial data (16).
Yet, each of these previous studies assessed emissions using different
methods, scopes, and primary data (see Materials and Methods for
details), generating inconsistent results and preventing meaningful
comparisons across studies. For example, Parshall et al. (17) and
Markolf et al. (18) only estimated the scope 1 emissions, whereas
Ramaswami et al. (3) included both direct and indirect emissions and
Ramaswami et al. (16) estimated the scope 1 + scope 2 emissions for
cities. The scope 1 emissions refer to CO2 emitted during energy com-
bustion or other human activities within a city boundary, while the
scope 2 emissions included CO2 induced by imported electricity/heat
generation. Mi et al. (19) calculated the consumption-based (scope 3)
emissions of 13 Chinese cities using an input-output method. The
consumption-based emissions quantify the emissions embodied in
the consumption of final products.
Furthermore, most of the previous studies of city-level emissions
provided a single number for total emissions (13) or, alternatively,
included only emissions from selected key sectors. Thus, the sketchy
emission accounts of cities cannot support in-depth discussion of
city-level emission characteristics and of potential policies for emis-
sion reduction. In addition, emission sources reported in different
studies are disparate, increasing the uncertainties and discrepancies
across studies. For example, Ramaswami et al. (3) calculated emissions
from “buildings and facilities’ energy final consumption, transportation,
and embodied energy consumption of key urban materials.” On the
other hand, Kennedy et al. (6) calculated emissions from seven sectors:
“electricity, heating and industrial fuels, ground transportation fuels,
aviation and marine transportation, industrial processes, product use,
and waste.” In contrast, Wang et al. (14) calculated city-level emissions
from “industries, transportation, household energy use, commerce, in-
dustrial processes, and waste.”
Comprehensive and consistent inventories of city-level emis-
sions based on physical energy flows are thus still badly needed,
including disaggregation of fossil fuel types and socioeconomic
sectors within cities’ boundaries. Our study provided the CO2
emission inventories for 182 Chinese cities by 17 fossil fuels and
46 socioeconomic sectors. We follow the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) administrative territorial approach,
which is compatible and consistent with national and international
emission inventories. The 46 sectors are classified according to
China’s System of National Accounts (further details in Materials
andMethods). The sectors classification can also bemapped with other
countries/cities around the world (20). The result is a set of consistent
and directly comparableCO2 emission inventories of cities that can pro-
vide robust and transparent data support for city-level emission con-
trol in China, as well as the nationwide Emission Trading Scheme.
The cities are defined as prefecture-level administrative units in
China (including both build-up city and administrative area). According
to the latest administrative planning report, there are currently 334
cities in China.We select 182 cities based on the data availability (see
Materials andMethods for data source). The 182 case cities encompass
62% of China’s population as well as 77% of its GDP in 2010.
We first classify cities into five groups according to their apparent
development pathway and then quantify the potential for emission re-
ductions among the city groups under a range of technological scenar-
ios. Our results reveal the extent to which different policies may reduce
emissions while in large part maintaining the current industrial struc-
ture and energy mix of cities and thereby minimize economic impacts.Shan et al., Sci. Adv. 2018;4 : eaaq0390 27 June 2018RESULTS
Emission inventories of 182 cities
Figure 1 shows the total CO2 emissions of 182 cities, which are for
2010.Most of the 182 cities are located in the eastern half of the country
[that is, under the Aihui-Tengchong line, where more than 90% of
China’s population resides (21)]. In 2010, the 182 cities emitted 7610
million tons (Mt) of CO2 in total. Industrial sectors make up the
largest share of emissions (6639 Mt of CO2 or 87% of the cities’ total),
especially power and heat production, iron and steel production, and
nonmetal minerals (cement, glass, and ceramics). Nonindustrial sectors
make up the remaining 12% (971 Mt of CO2), with two-thirds of emis-
sions from farming and direct energy use in rural areas. The pie charts
in fig. S1 (A and B) show the sector mix of 182 cities’ total CO2 emis-
sions. Figure S1C shows that burning of coal is the source of 74%
[especially raw coal (57%) and coke (9%)] of the cities’ total emissions,
with oil and natural gas combustion representing just 15 and 2%,
respectively, and the remaining 9% from industrial processes such
as cement production.
Population and socioeconomic development varies tremendously
among these cities: from 0.2 million people living in Jiayuguan (Gansu
province, northwest China) to 28.7 in Chongqing (southwest) and
from per-capita GDP of just ¥9068 in Fuyang (Anhui province, east)
to ¥175,125 in Ordos (Inner Mongolia, north). Similarly, colors in
Fig. 1 indicate that the total CO2 emissions of the 182 cities range
from <15 Mt (yellow) to >90 Mt (dark red; see also table S1). Higher
levels of emissions prevail in the north and east, and the top-emitting
cities represent a disproportionately large fraction of the total emis-
sions from the 182 cities. The top five emitting cities [Tangshan,
Shanghai, Suzhou (the one in Jiangsu province), Nanyang, and
Chongqing] accounted for 11% of the total in 2010. In addition, our
estimates of CO2 emission intensity, calculated as total emissions
divided by GDP, range from <0.1 to >1.5 metric tons of CO2 per ¥1000,
with a minimum of 0.04 and 0.05 metric tons of CO2 per ¥1000 in
Shenzhen (Guangdong province, east coast) and Huangshan (Anhui
province, east), respectively; a maximum of 1.72 and 1.55metric tons
of CO2 per ¥1000 in Hegang (Heilongjiang province, northeast) and
Panzhihua (Sichuan province, southwest), respectively; and an average
of 0.22 metric tons of CO2 per ¥1,000 (see table S1).
The detailed investigation of cities’ emissions by sectors and fuels
helps in understanding the wide range in cities’ carbon intensity: cities
such as Beijing and Shenzhen, whose emission intensities are just
0.07 and 0.04 metric tons of CO2 per ¥1000, respectively, have small
manufacturing and energy sectors (20 and 44% of their GDP, respec-
tively) and larger service sectors (75 and 53%, respectively). In contrast,
cities such as Maanshan, Tangshan, and Panzhihua have iron and steel
production as their “pillar” industries (21, 27, and 31% of their GDP,
respectively), with correspondingly high carbon intensities: 0.68, 0.43,
and 1.55 metric tons of CO2 per ¥1000, respectively. Similarly, in cities
where energy production andmining of natural resources are the dom-
inant industries, such asHegang, emission intensities are especially high
(1.72 metric tons of CO2 per ¥1000) because the activities are emission-
intensive, but such cities produce low value-added energy products
(such as cleaned coal, coke, and electricity).
Five city groups
Recognizing these characteristic differences, we use formal cluster anal-
ysis to classify the cities into five distinct groups based on their GDP and
industrial output: service-based cities (n = 8), high-tech cities (n = 24),
energy production cities (n = 32), heavy manufacturing cities (n = 51),2 of 15
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 Fig. 2. Spatial distribution of five city groups. Colors on the map indicate the categorization of each of the 182 cities into energy production (prod.) cities (red),
heavy manufacturing (manf.) cities (orange), light manufacturing cities (yellow), high-tech cities (green), and service-based cities (blue). Black circles and areas indicate
the location of coal and oil bases and common city cluster destinations for their energy exports.Fig. 1. Total CO2 emissions of 182 Chinese cities.Shan et al., Sci. Adv. 2018;4 : eaaq0390 27 June 2018 3 of 15
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 and light manufacturing cities (n = 67) (see Materials and Methods).
Figure 2 shows the geographical distribution of the cities in each group.
Most service-based andhigh-tech cities (blue and green in Fig. 2, respec-
tively) are located in east and south China, with 21 of the 32 gathered
into three city clusters (see map insets of Jing-Jin-Ji, the Yangtze River
Delta, and the Pearl River Delta). In contrast, the 32 energy production
cities (red in Fig. 2) are congregated in west and north China owing to
the location of fossil resources (mainly coal) in those regions. The heavy
and lightmanufacturing cities (orange and yellow in Fig. 2, respectively)
are more widely dispersed but with a large concentration in central
China.
Yet, none of the different types of cities are independent of the
others, and there is evidence of a division of labor among the city
groups. For example, although none of the three major city clusters
highlighted in Fig. 2 contain cities where energy production is the pillar
industry, each cluster is supported by energy imported from nearby
energy production centers: The Pearl River Delta cities are supported
by Maoming oil base, the Jing-Jin-Ji region obtains power from the
Shanxi–Inner Mongolia coal base, and the Yangtze River Delta cities
are supported by both theHuainan-Huaibei and Shanxi–InnerMongolia
coal bases (Fig. 2, black circles and arrows, and fig. S2). Emission-
intensive activities of outer-lying heavy and light manufacturing cities
similarly support production and consumption activities of the major
city clusters (19, 22).
Figure 3A shows the emission intensity’s mean values and SDs of
the five city groups. The average emission intensity is 0.47metric tons of
CO2 per ¥1000 in energy production cities, 0.31 metric tons of CO2 per
¥1000 in heavymanufacturing cities, 0.23metric tons of CO2 per ¥1000
in lightmanufacturing cities, 0.15metric tons of CO2 per ¥1000 in high-
tech cities, and 0.11metric tons ofCO2 per ¥1000 in service-based cities.
We find that among the five city groups, the energy production cities
have the highest average emission intensity, while the service-based
cities have the lowest value. The z test of mean values shows that the
average emission intensities of the service-based and high-tech cities are
significantly lower than those of the energy production and heavy
manufacturing cities at the 0.05 level. In addition, the average emission
intensity of the lightmanufacturing cities is significantly lower than that
of the energy production cities at the 0.05 level as well (seeMaterials and
Methods). The SDs of the energy production and heavy manufacturing
cities’ emission intensity are the largest among the five city groups (0.34
and 0.30 metric tons of CO2 per ¥1000, respectively). The SDs of high-
tech and service-based cities’ emission intensities are relatively small,
which are 0.08 and 0.07 metric tons of CO2 per ¥1000, respectively.
Such a difference in city groups’ energy intensity is determined by
the cities’ economic structures. The energy production and heavy man-
ufacturing cities have more energy-insensitive sectors, which emit high
CO2 with low economic outputs. Conversely, high-tech and service-
based cities rely more on the high-tech industries and service sectors.
This led them to lower emission intensities. Figure 3 (B to F) shows
the economic structures of the five city groups.
Figure 3 (B to F) and related z test of mean values (seeMaterials and
Methods) define the pillar industry of each city group. A city group’s
pillar industry has the highest share in economic structure compared
with other city groups. For example, the service sectors’ average share
in GDP of the service-based cities (59%) is significantly higher than
those of energy production (34%), heavy manufacturing (36%), light
manufacturing (36%), and high-tech (43%) cities. Similarly, the energy
production sectors’ average share in energy production cities (54%) is
the highest among the five city groups.Shan et al., Sci. Adv. 2018;4 : eaaq0390 27 June 2018Superemitting city sectors and CO2 reduction capacities in
industrial sectors
Given the strong influence of industrial activities on cities’ CO2
emissions, we next examine the potential for emission reductions in
industrial sectors through scenarios of specific technological improve-
ment. As each city has 39 industrial sectors (5 energy production, 16
heavy manufacturing, 13 light manufacturing, and 5 high-tech in-
dustries), there are 7098 industrial city sectors in total. The term “city
sector” refers to each industrial sector of each city; for example,
the sector “coal mining and dressing” of Beijing is a city sector, while
the sector “food processing” of Shanghai is another. We calculate the
per–industrial output emissions for the 7098 industrial city sectors.
We then identify three levels of superemitters of those city sectors
based on the city sectors’ per–industrial output emissions (23).
(1) Above-average emitters have per–industrial output emissions
greater than the sector mean.
(2) One SD superemitters have per–industrial output emissions
1s above the sector mean.
(3) Two SD superemitters have per–industrial output emissions 2s
above the sector mean. The 2 SD superemitters represent the most
carbon-intensive city sectors.
The few superemitters of city sectors represent a disproportionately
large fraction of the total emissions. The top 2.5% of the 7098 industrial
city sectors in per–industrial output emissions contribute 70% of total
CO2 emissions (Fig. 4A, emission-Lorenz curve). Figure 4 (B and C)
shows the top 10 and bottom 10 industrial city sectors, respectively,
in terms of emissions per industrial output.
To explore the potential emission reduction capacities via applying
technical improvement to the three levels of superemitting city sectors,
we define three scenarios. Scenario #3 is the strongest scenario when all
the above-average emitters improve their technology to the average
level, while scenario #1 is the mildest scenario.
(1) Scenario #1: 2 SD superemitting city sectors reach the current
national sector average emission intensity.
(2) Scenario #2: 1 SD superemitters reach the current sector average.
(3) Scenario #3: Above-average superemitters reach the current
sector average.
We then calculate the emission reduction capacities of the five city
groups’ pillar industry, under the three scenarios (shown in fig. S3A).
Under the strongest scenario, #3, reductions to cities’ pillar industries
alone could avoid emissions of 544 Mt of CO2 in energy production
cities, 388 Mt of CO2 in heavy manufacturing cities, 36 Mt of CO2 in
lightmanufacturing cities, and 1Mt of CO2 in high-tech cities, or 52, 38,
40, and 11%, respectively, of those cities’ pillar industry emissions.
Energy production and heavy manufacturing sectors are the primary
emission sources of every city group due to their high emission in-
tensities; therefore, we calculate the emission reduction capacities of the
cities’ energy production (fig. S3B) and heavy manufacturing sectors
(fig. S3C) as well.
Figure 5 and Table 1 summarize comprehensive results of the
potential emission reductions of city groups’ pillar industry, energy pro-
duction, and heavy manufacturing sectors. We presented the results
under three scenarios relative to a baseline of current emissions.
Although statistically few, mitigating emissions from only 2 SD
superemitters could nonetheless substantially reduce CO2 emissions,
particularly in heavy manufacturing and light manufacturing cities
(the second bars of each city group in Fig. 5). The emissions reduced
under scenario #1 of the energy production, heavymanufacturing, light
manufacturing, high-tech manufacturing, and service-based cities4 of 15
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 Fig. 3. Mean and standard deviation of emission intensity and economic structure of each city group. The bars present the mean value of the variables; the lines
above the bars show the +1 SD of the variables.Shan et al., Sci. Adv. 2018;4 : eaaq0390 27 June 2018 5 of 15
SC I ENCE ADVANCES | R E S EARCH ART I C L E
 o
n
 July 18, 2018
http://advances.sciencem
ag.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 are 61 Mt (or 4%), 122 Mt (6%), 242 Mt (13%), 0.3 Mt (0.03%), and
72Mt (9%), respectively. If scenario #3 technical improvement is ap-
plied to cities’ pillar, energy production, and heavy manufacturing in-
dustries, then the overall reductions are 2.4 gigatons (Gt) of CO2, or
31% of the cities’ emissions in 2010 (shown in Fig. 5 and Table 1).DISCUSSION
Updating and improving technologies might reduce emissions while
leaving the industrial structure of individual cities (and thus their re-
spective roles in the existing Chinese economy) unchanged. This isShan et al., Sci. Adv. 2018;4 : eaaq0390 27 June 2018critical, given the rapidity of targeted reductions; the central govern-
ment in China seeks to reduce national CO2 emission intensity by 60
to 65% compared with the 2005 level by 2020 (1). If the percentage
reductions of scenario #3 in 2010 (31%) are assumed to still be available
in 2014, then China’s emission intensity in 2014 could be 48.25% lower
than the 2005 level (the real emission intensity in 2014 is 25% lower
than the 2005 level). This would allow China to meet its 60 to 65%
commitments easier. Other options for meeting these goals, such as
radical industrial restructuring or large-scale shifts in the country’s
energymix (24), are unlikely to be feasible over the time span of just a
few years. For example, policies that simply shut down energy-intensiveFig. 4. City sectors ranked by per-industrial output emissions. Emission-Lorenz curve of 7098 industrial city sectors (A) and top/bottom 10 city sectors in per–
industrial output emission (B and C). The numbers alongside the y axis in (B) and (C) are the per–industrial output emissions of the city sectors. The numbers in
parentheses after the city name denote the sectors of the cities, which are consistent with the sectors’ ID number in table S2. The colors of the bars indicate the city
sectors’ categories (red, energy production; orange, heavy manufacturing; yellow, light manufacturing; green, high-tech industry). For example, Shangqiu (20) in (B)
refers to the “petroleum processing and coking” sector of Shangqiu and belongs to energy production (red); Beijing (34) in (C) refers to the “electronic and tele-
communications equipment” sector of Beijing and belongs to the high-tech industry (green).Fig. 5. CO2 emissions of city groups under three reduction scenarios. Potential reductions in CO2 emissions (in million tons) are shown for each of the five city
groups where the emission intensities of 2 SD, 1 SD, and above-average superemitters are brought down to the sector mean intensity (scenarios #1, #2, and #3,
respectively). The numbers on top of each scenario bar represent the potential reductions in CO2 emissions under the scenarios compared with the baseline. The
magnitude of reductions under scenario #1 is greatest in the light manufacturing cities, while the energy production cities have the largest reduction magnitude under
scenario #3. The overall reductions under scenario #3 are 2.4 Gt of CO2, or 31% of the cities’ emissions in 2010.6 of 15
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 industries would immediately and seriously affect the economies
of energy production and heavy industry cities, as well as the more
developed high-tech and service-based cities that depend on them.
Although it would be costly and disruptive for energy production–
and heavy industry–based cities to reorganize their industrial structure
in the short term (for example, by closing or relocating emission-
intensive industries), more affluent, service-based cities might be able
to quickly outsource their more emission-intensive industries without
economic hardship. However, such outsourcing by highly developed
cities could increase overall emissions; by virtue of their level of devel-
opment, these cities often have more advanced technologies in place,
and outsourcing would thus tend to move carbon-intensive, heavy-
polluting industries to less-developed regionswith less-efficient technol-
ogies. For example, ShougangCorporation, one of the largest steelmakingShan et al., Sci. Adv. 2018;4 : eaaq0390 27 June 2018companies in China, has moved progressively from Beijing to Hebei
province (mainly to Tangshan) since 2010. Beijing’s CO2 emissions de-
creased by 7.6Mt during 2010 to 2015, but emissions inHebei province
increased by 87.1 Mt during the same period (25), and Shougang Cor-
poration is one of themain causes of the increase.Whereas the emission
intensity of iron and steel production in Beijing was 1.4 metric tons of
CO2 per ¥1000 in 2007, the intensity of the same sector inTangshanwas
2.6 metric tons of CO2 per ¥1000 in 2010 (86% higher). Although a few
affluent cities have reduced the proportion of coal in their energy mix
[for example, Beijing has reduced its coal consumption by 61%, or
18.2Mt from2007 to 2015 (26, 27)] through a combination of increased
renewables and natural gas, China’s large stocks of cheap coal and
equally large fleet of young, coal-burning power plants (28) are daunting
economic barriers to radical near-term shifts in the Chinese energymix.Table 1. CO2 emissions of five city groups by sector categories under the three reduction scenarios (2010, million tons).City groups Scenario Energy
productionHeavy
manufacturingLight
manufacturingHigh-tech Farming, construction,
services, and householdTotalEnergy production cities Baseline 1037.26 291.28 28.16 4.71 123.97 1485.37Scenario #1 1022.23 245.35 28.16 4.71 123.97 1424.42Scenario #2 897.47 236.99 28.16 4.71 123.97 1291.30Scenario #3 493.63 126.42 28.16 4.71 123.97 776.89Heavy manufacturing
citiesBaseline 912.60 1017.10 48.24 4.76 225.90 2208.61Scenario #1 808.38 999.65 48.24 4.76 225.90 2086.94Scenario #2 796.62 970.20 48.24 4.76 225.90 2045.73Scenario #3 599.36 628.84 48.24 4.76 225.90 1507.11Light manufacturing
citiesBaseline 928.88 629.15 90.87 7.22 246.99 1903.10Scenario #1 723.50 592.64 90.34 7.22 246.99 1660.68Scenario #2 670.52 572.87 89.37 7.22 246.99 1586.97Scenario #3 562.16 399.96 54.86 7.22 246.99 1271.18High-tech industry cities Baseline 607.05 393.85 53.46 8.28 157.55 1220.18Scenario #1 607.00 393.57 53.46 8.27 157.55 1219.84Scenario #2 591.56 350.45 53.46 8.27 157.55 1161.29Scenario #3 489.64 318.66 53.46 7.39 157.55 1026.68Service-based cities Baseline 341.79 190.15 23.02 20.94 216.45 792.36Scenario
#1270.51 189.75 23.02 20.94 216.45 720.68Scenario
#2270.51 189.55 23.02 20.94 216.45 720.48Scenario
#3256.67 123.91 23.02 20.94 216.45 640.99Total (all 182 cities) Baseline 3827.57 2521.53 243.75 45.90 970.86 7609.62Scenario #1 3431.63 2420.95 243.22 45.90 970.86 7112.56Scenario #2 3226.69 2320.05 242.26 45.90 970.86 6805.76Scenario #3 2401.45 1597.79 207.74 45.01 970.86 5222.867 of 15
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findings suggest that China’s near-term goals of reducing its emission
intensity may be feasibly accomplished by targeted technological im-
provements, buying time for the longer-term strategies of shifting
to non-fossil energy and amore service-based economy.Moreover, im-
proving and optimizing the energy and carbon efficiency of industrial
production processes and operations could help lower the costs of
advanced technologies and thus facilitate their deployment in less-
developed cities and countries beyond China. o
n
 July 18, 2018
http://advances.sciencem
ag.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 CONCLUSION
In order for China to cost-effectively reach its goal of reducing CO2
emission intensity by 60 to 65% and running a nationwide Emission
Trading Scheme over the next few years, policy-makers in the country
need increasingly specific, subnational information about the sources
of CO2 and the potential reductions and economic implications of dif-
ferent possible policies. By categorizing Chinese cities according to
their development stage and industrial makeup, we offer policy-makers
an opportunity to meaningfully differentiate across the wide range in
city-level CO2 emissions (from 1.6 to 194 Mt) and emission intensity
(from 0.04 to 1.72 metric tons of CO2 per ¥1000). Further, because
the lower emission intensities of affluent cities (that is, high-tech and
service-based cities) are supported by imports from less affluent, indus-
trial, and energy-producing cities located nearby, consumption-based
policies may allow more developed cities to subsidize emission reduc-
tions without undercutting the economic core of still-developing cities
by directly regulating their manufacturing and the electric sectors.
However, where policies directly targeting manufacturing and
electric power infrastructure are implemented, our sectoral analysis of
each city indicates that targeted technological improvements may be a
practical and effective means of reducing emissions while preserving
cities’ current economic structure and energy systems. In particular,
by focusing efforts on superemitting industry sectors in each city,
roughly 30% of China’s carbon emissions might be eliminated.
Although the leveling off of China’s CO2 emissions in recent years is
a tremendous watershed in the global effort to avoid dangerous climate
change, the progress reflects sweeping policies to improve the country’s
industrial technologies and energy systems. Further progress will in-
creasingly depend on policies that differentiate among cities according
to their economic structure, level of development, and infrastructure
and are carefully crafted to target the largest and most cost-effective
emission reductions.
In addition, rapidly growing cities with “new” investments in infra-
structure and institutions tend to emulate already-established cities and
thereby lock into the “old” development paths. Instead, promoting low-
carbon transitions at early stages of industrialization implies careful
consideration of “future fit”—how industries can be designed and run
to optimize or decouple the relationship between their economic
productivity and energy use (or environmental impact). The socio-
economic and environmental characteristics of the 182 cities repre-
sent various stages of industrialization, from the preindustrialization
stage (for example, energy production cities in Shanxi and Inner
Mongolia) to the postindustrialization stage (such as Beijing and
Shanghai). In turn, this cross section of Chinese cities we analyze
may provide important insights for other developing countries seeking
to target superemitting sectors/units in their cities, perhaps enabling
them to bypass or abbreviate the most emission-intensive phases of
industrialization.Shan et al., Sci. Adv. 2018;4 : eaaq0390 27 June 2018MATERIALS AND METHODS
CO2 emission accounts and data source
Scopes
Three approaches are usually used to account for the CO2 emissions of
one country: the territorial-based, production-based, and consumption-
based approaches. According to the IPCC (29), the territorial-based
emissions are CO2 emitted within one administrative unit. In the
production-approach, not only “emissions from international aviation
and shipping are typically allocated to the country of the relevant vessel’s
operator” [(30), p. 453] but also the “emissions from international tourism
are allocated based on where individual tourists are resident, rather than
their destination” [(30), p. 453]. The consumption-based emissions are
calculated according to the final products’ consumption (31).
Similarly, three “scopes” are defined by the World Resources Insti-
tute (WRI) and the World Business Council for Sustainable Develop-
ment (32) to account for the regional CO2 emissions. Scope 1 includes
emissions from in-boundary fossil fuel combustion, industrial process/
product use,wastes, and other in-boundary activities. Scope 2 refers to the
in-boundary electricity/heat-related emissions induced by the purchased
electricity and heat. Scope 3 includes all the out-of-boundary emissions
such as emissions from aviation/marine and imported products/services
(6). Accordingly, four system boundaries for regional emission accounts
are defined on the basis of the three scopes: system boundary 1 is equal
to scope 1 emissions; system boundary 2 includes both scope 1 and
scope 2 emissions; system boundary 3 is equal to scope 1 plus scope
3 emissions; while system boundary 4 is consumption-based emissions
(also called carbon footprint) (33).
Considering the higher uncertainties and incomparability of the scope
3 emissions, most of the previous studies on city-level emission accounts
focusmainly on the scope 1 territorial emissions (34).Here, we considered
the scope 1 territorial emission as well owing to the city-level data acces-
sibility inChina.The territorial emissionsdescribe the currentCO2emission
inducedwithinonecountry/region’s administrativeboundary.The territorial
emissions are usually used for the emission feature analysis and for the
reduction policy-making. Territorial emissions are the foundation of the
other emission approaches, in that production- and consumption-based
emissions are calculated on the basis of territorial emissions.
The territorial CO2 emissions of cities in this study included both the
fossil fuel–related and process-related emissions. The fossil fuel–related
emissions were induced by the fossil fuel combustions. Per the defini-
tion of territorial direct CO2 emissions, the cities’ CO2 emissions in this
study did not include the part induced by imported/purchased electricity
and heat. The emissions from the fossil fuel burnt in power plants for
electricity/heat generation were allocated to the power and heat sector
of the location cities. In addition, we removed the energy used as raw
materials during industrial processes (shown as non-energy use in
energy statistics) from the total consumption; this part did not emit
CO2 either (35). The process-related emissions referred to CO2 that
escaped from chemical reaction during the industrial processes (36),
rather than emissions from fossil fuel combustion to gain power, which
were accounted as fossil fuel–related emissions. Above all, this study
calculated the cities’ IPCC territorial administrative emissions from
17 kinds of fossil fuels (fossil fuel–related; see table S3) and 7 industrial
processes (process-related; see table S4).
CO2 emission calculation method
IPCC (29) provided methods for CO2 emission accounting based on
mass-balance theory. The emissions were estimated as the product of
activity data (energy consumption or industrial productions) and the cor-
responding emission factors. The method is widely used by researchers.8 of 15
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 On the basis of the IPCCmethod, the National Development and Re-
form Commission of China (NDRC) designed an emission account
system for Chinese provinces (35). Furthermore, in the “Global
Protocol for Community-Scale Greenhouse Gas Emission Inventories”
and “International Local Government GHG Emissions Analysis
Protocol”, WRI et al. (37) and Local Governments for Sustainability
(ICLEI) (38) provided a bottom-up approach for higher-precision
city-level emission accounting. The ISO 14064 and 37120 series of
standards also provided guidelines for emission accounts at the enter-
prise level (39).Shan et al., Sci. Adv. 2018;4 : eaaq0390 27 June 2018Alternative approaches were developed to account for the city-level
emissions. For example, Cai et al. (40) used spatial models to build a
bottom-up emission database forChinese cities at 1 km×1kmresolution.
Doll et al. (41), Ma et al. (42), and Meng et al. (43) used nighttime light
imagery to estimate city CO2 emissions. These approaches can potentially
provide more detailed emissions or full-coverage emissions for Chinese
cities. However, they have higher data requirements compared with the
IPCC methods, making them difficult to implement. Furthermore, city-
level emissions calculated by these methods are not comparable with the
national emission inventories due to differences inmethods and scopes.Fig. 6. Mean test (z test) results of the five city groups. n/a, not applicable.9 of 15
SC I ENCE ADVANCES | R E S EARCH ART I C L ETable 2. Mean test (z test) results of the five city groups. The Z critical one-tailed value is 1.645, while the Z critical two-tailed value is 1.960.ShaIndexn et al., Sci. Adv. 2018;4 : eaaq0390 2City groups7 June 2018z P(Z ≤ z) one-tailed P(Z ≤ z) two-tailedCO2 emission intensityService and high-tech cities −0.221 0.413 0.825Service and light manufacturing cites −0.951 0.171 0.341Service and heavy manufacturing cities −2.033 0.021* 0.042*Service and energy production cities −3.137 0.001* 0.002*High-tech and light manufacturing cities −1.013 0.156 0.311High-tech and heavy manufacturing cities −2.31 0.010* 0.021*High-tech and energy production cities −3.495 0.000* 0.000*Light and heavy manufacturing cities −1.631 0.051** 0.103Light manufacturing and energy production cities −2.982 0.001* 0.003*DHeavy manufacturing and energy production cities −1.481 0.069
** 0.139o
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 Service sectors’ share in GDPService and high-tech cities 1.435 0.076** 0.151Service and light manufacturing cites 2.063 0.020* 0.039*Service and heavy manufacturing cities 2.177 0.015* 0.029*Service and energy production cities 2.107 0.018* 0.035*High-tech and light manufacturing cities 1.049 0.147 0.294vHigh-tech and heavy manufacturing cities 1.258 0.104 0.208 anceHigh-tech and energy production cities 1.165 0.122 0.244 s.sciLight and heavy manufacturing cities 0.299 0.382 0.765 enceLight manufacturing and energy production cities 0.425 0.335 0.671 m
agHeavy manufacturing and energy production cities 0.205 0.419 0.838 . o
n
 July 18, 2018
org/Energy production sectors’ share
in industrial outputService and high-tech cities 0.585 0.279 0.558Service and light manufacturing cites 0.304 0.381 0.761Service and heavy manufacturing cities 0.287 0.387 0.774Service and energy production cities −3.529 0.000* 0.000*High-tech and light manufacturing cities −0.505 0.307 0.614High-tech and heavy manufacturing cities −0.499 0.309 0.618High-tech and energy production cities −4.846 0.000* 0.000*Light and heavy manufacturing cities −0.021 0.492 0.983Light manufacturing and energy production cities −4.921 0.000* 0.000*Heavy manufacturing and energy production cities −4.816 0.000* 0.000*Heavy manufacturing sectors’
share in industrial outputService and high-tech cities 0.139 0.445 0.889Service and light manufacturing cites 0.397 0.346 0.691Service and heavy manufacturing cities −1.593 0.056** 0.111Service and energy production cities 1.410 0.079** 0.158High-tech and light manufacturing cities 0.160 0.437 0.873High-tech and heavy manufacturing cities −1.877 0.030* 0.061**High-tech and energy production cities 1.631 0.051** 0.103continued on next page10 of 15
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 Here, we adopted the IPCC and NDRC methods. The CO2 emis-
sions from fossil fuel combustion (CEenergy) were calculated in Eq. 1,
while the process-related emissions (CEprocess) were calculated in Eq. 2.
CEenergy ¼ ∑i∑jCEij ¼ ∑i∑jADij NCVi  CCi  Oij ð1Þ
In Eq. 1, CEij refers to the CO2 emissions by fossil fuel type i and
sector j; ADij, the activity data, means the corresponding fossil fuel con-
sumption. NCVi, CCi, andOij are known as emission factors. NCVi re-
fers to net caloric value, which is the heat value produced per physical
unit of fossil fuel combusted (in J/ton); CCi (carbon content) is the CO2
emissions per net caloric value produced from a given fossil fuel type i
(in metric tons of CO2/J);Oij is the oxygenation efficiency, which refers
to the oxidation ratio when fossil fuels are burned (in %).
NCVi and CCiwere collected on the basis of our previous investiga-
tions on China’s fossil fuel quality (44), which were assumed to bemore
suitable for China, and are now being used by the Chinese government
in its recently released report on climate change (see table S3) (45).
Oij values were collected from NDRC (35), which were considered
differently for fossil fuels used in different sectors, as the combustionShan et al., Sci. Adv. 2018;4 : eaaq0390 27 June 2018technology level of sectors are different in China. The discussion of
emission factors’ comparisons and detailed data are presented in our
previous study (25).
In Eq. 2, CEprocess refers to the CO2 emissions emitted from indus-
trial processes. ADt refers to the production of industrial process t, while
EFt is the corresponding emission factor. The emission factors (EFt)
were collected from IPCC (29) and NDRC (35) (see table S4).
CEprocess ¼ ∑tCEt ¼ ∑tADt  EFt ð2Þ
Emission inventory construction and formatting
As discussed above, our direct territorial CO2 emissions included 17
kinds of fossil fuels (i ∈ [1, 17]) and 7 industrial processes (t ∈ [1, 7]).
The fossil fuel–related emissions were calculated on the basis of 46-
sectoral energy consumption; therefore, the cities’ emission inventories
were constructedby46 socioeconomic sectors ( j∈ [1, 46]), corresponding
to the national sectors classification defined by the National Administra-
tion forQuality Supervision and Inspection andQuarantine (see table S2)
(46). The sector classification is widely used in the System of National
Accounts in China.Index City groups z P(Z ≤ z) one-tailed P(Z ≤ z) two-tailedLight and heavy manufacturing cities −4.678 0.000* 0.000*Light manufacturing and energy production cities 2.034 0.021* 0.042*Heavy manufacturing and energy production cities 5.516 0.000* 0.000*Light manufacturing sectors’
share in industrial outputService and high-tech cities −0.283 0.388 0.777Service and light manufacturing cites −2.068 0.019* 0.039*Service and heavy manufacturing cities 0.312 0.378 0.755Service and energy production cities 0.196 0.422 0.845High-tech and light manufacturing cities −2.992 0.001* 0.003*High-tech and heavy manufacturing cities 1.037 0.150 0.300High-tech and energy production cities 0.700 0.242 0.484Light and heavy manufacturing cities 4.825 0.000* 0.000*Light manufacturing and energy production cities 3.473 0.000* 0.001*Heavy manufacturing and energy production cities −0.150 0.440 0.881High-tech industry’s share
in industrial outputService and high-tech cities 1.463 0.072** 0.144Service and light manufacturing cites 1.681 0.046* 0.090**Service and heavy manufacturing cities 1.801 0.036* 0.072**Service and energy production cities 2.481 0.007* 0.013*High-tech and light manufacturing cities 2.481 0.007* 0.013*High-tech and heavy manufacturing cities 2.830 0.002* 0.005*High-tech and energy production cities 0.505 0.307 0.613Light and heavy manufacturing cities 0.784 0.216 0.433Light manufacturing and energy production cities 0.341 0.366 0.733Heavy manufacturing and energy production cities 1.463 0.072** 0.144*Significant at the 0.05 level. **Significant at the 0.10 level.11 of 15
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 The 46 sectors include 1 farming, 1 construction, 3 service sectors, 2
household energy use (urban and rural), and 39 industrial sectors. The
39 industrial sectors canbe grouped into four categories: energy produc-
tion, heavy manufacturing, light manufacturing, and high-tech in-
dustries. The energy production category includes five sectors that
produce either primary or secondary energy types, while the high-tech
category refers to five sectors aiming at high and new technical in-
dustries. The remaining 29 sectors belong to manufacturing sectors,
including both heavy and lightmanufacturing sectors. Here, we defined
the heavy manufacturing category to include 16 sectors that input
energy to produce intermediate products, such as “ferrous metals
mining and dressing” and “nonmetal mineral products.” We classified
13 sectors as light manufacturing sectors, which mainly produce final
products such as food processing and furniture manufacturing. We al-
located the CO2 emissions from seven industrial processes to the
following sectors: “raw chemical materials and chemical products,”
“nonmetal mineral products,” and “smelting and processing of ferrous
metals” (see table S4).
Activity data collection and source
The 46-sectoral fossil fuel consumptions (ADij) were collected on the
basis of the “energy balance table” and “industrial sectoral energy con-
sumption table” from the city’s statistical yearbook. We collected the
energy consumption data of the nonindustrial sectors (that is, farming,
service sectors, and household energy use) from the energy balance
table. The energy balance table illustrates the energy data of one region,
such as production, import, input and output transformation, final con-
sumption, and loss (see table S5). Because of the poor data quality at the
city level, only 10% (or 17) of the 182 cities have the energy balance table
in their statistical yearbooks. The remaining 90% (or 165) of the cities
do not have the table. Considering the completeness and consistency of
cities’ emission inventories, we followed our previous study to scale
down the corresponding provincial tables to obtain the city-level energy
consumption data of these nonindustrial sectors (47).We used theGDP
for the farming, construction, and service sectors, assuming that the city
has the same farming/construction/service energy intensities as its
province, and used the urban/rural population for the urban/rural
household energy consumption, assuming that the city has the same
per-capita residential energy consumption as its province. The data
of GDP and population were collected from cities’ and their corres-
ponding provinces’ statistical yearbooks.
As for the energy consumption data from the 39 industrial sectors,
the energy balance table only provides the total amount of the 39 sectors
(shown as one industry sector). Here, we collected the energy consump-
tion of the cities’ 39 industrial sectors from the industrial sectoral energy
consumption table, which were investigated by the cities’ statistics office
at the enterprise level.
The industrial productions of cities (ADt) were collected from cities’
statistical yearbooks directly. Cities’ population, GDP, industry output,
and other socioeconomic datawere collected fromcities’ statistical year-
books and China City Statistical Yearbook 2011. Results and original
data were freely available for download fromChina Emission Accounts
and Datasets (CEADs; www.ceads.net) after registration.
Consistency with the national and provincial inventories
in China
The city-level emission inventories in this studywere constructed by the
territorial scope, IPCC calculation method, and framework that were
consistently used in China’s official emission accounts and our previous
studies of the national and provincial level. Such consistency makes the
multiscale emission inventories comparable. The consistent, transparent,Shan et al., Sci. Adv. 2018;4 : eaaq0390 27 June 2018comparable emission inventories at multiscales provide robust data
support for China’s emission control and the emission trading scheme.
First, the cities’ CO2 emissions in this study had the same scope and
framework as China’s national and provincial territorial emissions. We
included the CO2 emissions from the fossil fuel combustion and in-
dustrial processes only. The emissions from the electricity and heat
generation (which are non-fossil fuels) were allocated to the power
plants, rather than to their final consumption sectors. The scope and
framework were consistent with the NDRC guidelines for provincial
greenhouse gas inventories, which were widely used in China’s emis-
sion accounts and studies (25, 35). Second, our cities’ CO2 emissions
were calculated using the IPCC equation, in which the emissions
were equal to activity data times by emission factors. We used China’s
most up-to-date emission factors to calculate the cities’ emissions (44).
The emission factors were also used in the official emission accounts in
China (45). Moreover, our city-level emission inventories were con-
structed as 17 fossil fuels and 46 socioeconomic sectors. The 17 fossil
fuels were consistent with China’s latest energy statistical system, and
the 46 socioeconomic sectors correspondedwith the System ofNational
Accounts in China.
The self-consistent emission accounting framework used in this
study provides reference for other developing countries without
integrated emission accounts. Despite the quality of emission data
having been formally required by the “Paris Agreement,” the capacities
of inventorying emissions in developing countries remain insufficient,
especially in Asia and Africa. Among the 37 developing countries in
Asia, only 17 have relatively high inventorying capacities (48). The other
20Asian countries, such asYemen,NorthKorea, Kazakhstan, Laos, and
Cambodia, have limited inventorying capacities. This is mainly
caused by their poor statistical system (49). These developing countries
with similar limited access to data could refer to this study’smethods for
dealing with lack of data to calculate their own CO2 emissions.
Uncertainties of cities’ CO2 emission inventories
Emission estimates are subject to uncertainty due to incomplete knowl-
edge of activity data and emission factors. Different methods could also
result in potential biases in estimates. To more completely assess un-
certainties in our city-level emission accounts, we used theMonte Carlo
method recommended by IPCC (29) and used by previous scholars
widely (50). The term “uncertainty” in this study refers to the lower
and upper bounds of a certain confidence interval (CI) around our cen-
tral estimate. All of the input parameters of activity data and emission
factors, with assumed normal distributions, were placed in a Monte
Carlo framework. Twenty thousand simulations were performed
to analyze the uncertainty of estimated emissions by sectors. We as-
sumed that both activity data and emission factors were normally dis-
tributed. Coefficients of variation (CVs; SD divided by the mean) were
collected from literature: The activity data had CVs ranging from 5 to
30% depending on the sector (29, 50–54); the emission factors had CVs
of 3% (coal), 1% (oil), and 2% (natural gas) (44).
The results show that 97.5% uncertainties (±47.5% CI around the
central estimate) of 182 cities fall in (−3.65%, 3.67%). The highest un-
certainty appeared in Hegang (−5.83%, 5.86%), while the lowest
appeared in Huizhou (−0.91%, 0.91%). Energy production and high
emission cities usually have a relatively higher uncertainty of CO2
emissions.
In our previous research, we compared our estimation of five cities’
emission with the calculation through a bottom-up approach (55, 56).
The result shows that the difference between two results is within 10%12 of 15
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 (47), which is within the uncertainty range and is acceptable for devel-
oping countries (57, 58).
Cluster analysis for city classification
Different methods were used to cluster Chinese cities to discuss previ-
ous city-level emissions. For example, Ramaswami et al. (15) used GDP
share to classify 285 Chinese cities into 38 industrial cities, 44 commer-
cial cities, and 203 mixed-economy cities. Such a taxonomy method is
further developed based on Nelson (59) and is widely used in city-level
research.
Here, we combined the cluster analysis and GDP share method to
group the 182 cities. The advantage of cluster analysis is that it groups
samples with a set of indicators rather than a single one (60). Cluster
analysis has been widely used in econometrics (61, 62) and other inter-
disciplinary studies (63). The basic rationale of cluster analysis is group-
ing samples with similar attributes. The samples within the groups will
be close together geometrically, while the statistical distance between
groups will be farther. The statistical distance is measured by distance
metrics, such as Euclidean distance,Manhattan distance, andMinkowski
distance.
K-means algorithm is one of the cluster algorithms in which the
desired number of clusters could be specified in advance before
choosing the “best” solution (64). According to a previous study on
comparison of different distance metrics used in K-means algorithm,
the Euclidian distance metric’s performance is better than others (65).
Therefore, we used K-means algorithm implemented using the Euclid-
ean distance metric to group cities in this study. The SPSS software
was used.
As this study focused on the city-level industrialization process, we
used the cities’ manufacturing structure as indicators to conduct the
cluster analysis to expose the cities’ pillar industries as well as their po-
sition in the industrialization process. The manufacturing structures
were calculated on the basis of each city’s sectoral industrial outputs
of the four categories’manufacturing sectors (energy production, heavy
manufacturing, light manufacturing, and high-tech industry) in the
following steps:
(1) We calculated each city’s industrial output share (IO) of the four
manufacturing categories: energy production (IOEP), heavy manufac-
turing (IOHM), light manufacturing (IOLM), and high-tech industry
(IOHT). Taking Beijing as an example, IOEP−Beijing is equal to the
energy productions’ industrial outputs divided by Beijing’s total in-
dustrial outputs (28%). IOHM−Beijing, IOLM−Beijing, and IOHT−Beijing
are 37, 11, and 24, respectively, in 2010. This means 28% of Beijing’s
industrial outputs are contributed by energy productions, while 24%
are contributed by high-tech industries.
(2) We then sorted the cities according to their sectors’ industrial
output share from small to large and obtained the cities’ rankings of
each manufacturing category. Taking Beijing as an example, IOHT−Beijing
ranks 124 of the total 182 case cities, while IOHT−Beijing ranks 52, which
implies that Beijing hasmore high-tech than heavymanufacturing indus-
tries compared with other case cities.
(3) We changed the rankings into percentiles (IO′). Beijing’s high-
tech industry share is ahead of 90.11% of the case cities (IO′HTBeijing ¼
124
182 100%).
In this way, we first clustered the 182 case cities into four groups
using each city’s manufacturing structure. The cluster analysis results
show that group 1 included 22 cities with more energy production en-
terprises, group 2 included 41 cities with higher ranking in heavy
manufacturing, and group 3 included 65 cities that relied more on lightShan et al., Sci. Adv. 2018;4 : eaaq0390 27 June 2018manufacturing. The remaining 54 cities were grouped together in group
4 (high-tech).
As the cluster analysis was operated on the basis of mathematical
relationships, the results may be distinct with the practical situation.
We adjusted the results slightly according to other information and
the actual situations in this empirical analysis. For example, Xianyang
was moved from group 4 to the energy group due to its high ranking in
the energy sector category (88) and huge absolute value of energy pro-
duction output (¥50,398 million).
Following the cities’ industrialization process, the most developed
high-tech cities will further develop into service-based cities. These
service citiesmay go through every stage of the industrialization process
in the past decades, and they have now successfully transferred their
pillar industry to service sectors with low emission intensity. They
presented sophisticated and practical roadmaps of economic structure
optimization and low-carbon development. Therefore, this study extracted
these service-based cities from the previous high-tech group to form a new
group. Here, the service-based cities were defined as high-tech cities with a
higher than 50.63% service sectors’ share in GDP. The 50.63% boundary
was calculated as the high-tech cities’ average service sectors’ share inGDP
(15). There were eight cities in the service-based city group: Beijing,
Shanghai, Nanjing, Jinan,Wuhan, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Xi’an.
In this way, the 182 case cities were finally clustered into five city
groups with different pillar industries and development pathways.
We named the city groups after their pillar industries: 32 energy cities,
51 heavy manufacturing cities, 67 light manufacturing cities, 24 high-
tech cities, and 8 service-based cities (see table S1). To validate the city
group, we applied the z test to compare each city group’s average emis-
sion intensity and economic structures, as shown in Fig. 6 and Table 2.
Figure 6A shows that the emission intensity of energy production
citieswas significantly higher than that of the lightmanufacturing, high-
tech, and service-based cities at the 0.05 level, while the heavy
manufacturing cities had a higher average emission intensity than
high-tech and service-based cities. The average emission intensities
of light manufacturing, high-tech, and service-based cities did not
differ significantly. This was determined by the cities’ pillar industry
and economic structures. Energy production and heavy manufacturing
cities hadmore energy-intensive enterprises. On the contrary, the high-
tech and service-based cities relied more on high-tech industries and
service sectors. This can be verified in Fig. 6 (B to F).
In Fig. 6B, the service sectors’ average share in GDP of the service-
based citieswas significantly higher than those of the energy production,
heavy manufacturing, and light manufacturing cities. The service
sectors’ average share in GDP of other city groups did not differ signif-
icantly. Similar results can be found in the z test of energy production
sectors (Fig. 6C), light manufacturing sectors (Fig. 6E), and high-tech
industries (Fig. 6F). As for the z test of the heavymanufacturing sectors,
we found that the sectors’ average share in economic structure was sig-
nificantly different from those of energy production, light manufac-
turing, and high-tech cities (at the 0.10 level). Moreover, the sectors’
average share was also significantly different between the energy pro-
duction and light manufacturing cities.
Above all, the z test for the mean value between city groups verified
the city clusters. The pillar industry of a city group was significantly
higher than the others.
Limitations and future work
This study has some limitations, whichmainly lie in the accuracy of the
cities’ emission accounts. Further work should focus on the following13 of 15
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 three aspects to improve the accuracy of the cities’ emission accounts, as
well as their emission reduction potentials.
First of all, the downscale emission inventories developed in this
study should be compared with the bottom-up emission inventories.
As discussed earlier, the bottom-up emissions (16, 40, 42, 43) were
calculated on the basis of survey data from enterprises. For each city,
we would be able to identify a number of key emission-intensive en-
terprises. Survey data from those enterprises would provide more accu-
rate estimates for those superemitting sectors.
Second, this study developed only 1-year cross-sectional data to de-
fine the cities’ pillar industries, which could not disclose the dynamic
changes of the cities’ pillar industries, that is, the historical development
pathways. In the future, time-series data should be developed to illus-
trate the cities’ change of pillar industries and sketch the industrializa-
tion process of Chinese cities in past decades.
Third, this study focused on the emission reduction potentials of key
industrial sectors only, which may skew the results toward cities with
more industry and power generation. We paid less attention to the
cities’ nonindustrial sectors (farming, construction, services, and
households) and their emission-saving potentials. This was primarily
restricted by the emission data for nonindustrial sectors. Further studies
should try to improve estimation of emissions in urban service sectors.
We would like to conduct a large survey to measure the differences be-
tween emission intensities of service-related sectors across 50+ selected
cities in China. o
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